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ARBITRATION:
UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT
INTRODUCTION
As the prospects for peaceful settlement between an insured and his
uninsured motorist carrier fail, attention is drawn to the policy's en-
forcement terms. Most (though not all) uninsured motorist endorse-
ments written in the United States today include an arbitration clause
and its "corollary," a permission to sue or consent to be bound clause.'
These terms were designed to protect the insurer's interests where the
measure of the insurer's disbursement might be decided in a settlement
or lawsuit to which it would not be a party.
This paper will deal with the problem of enforceability against an
objecting party, and the scope of such arbitration proceedings, that is,
which specific issues of law or fact may or must be resolved through
arbitration.
The attitudes of the courts to arbitration after it has been concluded
will be considered in the section of judicial review. A portion of the
paper is then devoted to arbitration in Wisconsin. The final section
considers some of the factors which make arbitration attractive or un-
attractive to the parties.
I. ENFORCEABILITY
This section canvasses the treatment of various states of the question
of whether arbitration provisions are enforceable against the desires of
one or the other of the parties. Although either party may choose to
raise this issue, in the typical situation it is the insured who for one
reason or another has decided to reject arbitration. Once either the
insured or his uninsured motorist carrier has chosen to resist, three al-
ternatives are presented: (a) To continue an effort toward settlement,
(b) to simply become or remain inactive, or (c) to commence suit with
or without an express waiver of arbitration by the other party. The
other party is then also faced with a choice: (a) to expressly agree to
waive arbitration, (b) to continue settlement efforts, (c) to become or
remain inactive (d) to commence suit, or (e) to attempt to enforce
the arbitration provision by commencing arbitration proceedings and/or
procuring a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration.2
By implementing one or another of these courses of action, the party
is faced with several potential issues: (1) If he does not in a timely way
begin properly to enforce arbitration, he may create circumstances out
of which a waiver to his right to insist on arbitration would later be
I See appendix infra at 436.
2The standard language contemplates arbitration upon the written demand
of either the insured or his insurer. The language of a particular endorsement
may vary, however. See Bradt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 21 Mich. App. 529, 175
N.W.2d 876 (1970), where arbitration could commence only upon demand
of the insured.
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implied; (2) If he begins to enforce, he may waive his right to rely
subsequently on certain defenses. Thus, the question of enforceability
also involves the problem of waiver, both of the right to rely on arbitra-
tion and of certain conditions precedent to recovery.
The pattern outlined above becomes more complex where the insured
faces two or more joint tortfeasors rather than one, especially where
not all tortfeasors are without insurance coverage. In Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tomanski,3 the two joint tortfeasors were regarded as a
single unit in the sense that, since at least one of the tortfeasors was
insured, there was in fact insurance available. The tortfeasors rather
than the uninsured motorist carrier were seen as primarily liable to
insureds, and since there was some primary insurance coverage on their
part, it was held that the contingency of an uninsured motorist tort
liability had not yet occurred. The court allowed that arbitration would
become available to insureds, however, if and when the insured tort-
feasor was found not liable, or his insurance coverage unavailable to
insureds.4
Further problems may arise where there are multiple policies or
multiple insurers. Generally, it seems that each uninsured motorist
insurer would be able to require a separate arbitration under each of
its policies. Apart from expense and delay, of course, this would raise
a question of res judicata. On the other hand, in Pennsylvania Gen.
Ins, Co. v. Barr,5 where the insured demanded arbitration under three
separate policies issued by two insurers, the court saw no difficulty in
the ordering of one arbitration for all the parties.
It may be noted at this point that in most respects the arbitration
provisions were intended to operate as a unit with the permission to
sue, or in later policies, the consent to be bound clause-such that con-
duct which implies a waiver of the right to enforce arbitration will
usually also waive the right to rely on these other "corollary" clauses.
The principles of waiver remain the same, of course, and are applied
whenever reliance is placed on a policy limitation or exclusion.
Now, where the attempt is made to enforce, and the right has not
been waived, the law of the various states will resolve the question in
different ways.
A. English Rule, Common Law
Generally the common law distinguished agreements to arbitrate
present disputes from agreements to arbitrate future disputes. The
3 21 Ohio App. 2d 271, 257 N.E.2d 399 (1970).
4 Morateck v. Milw. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 95, 148 N.W.2d 704 (1967);
Fouquier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1967); See also
ORE. Rav. STATS. § 743.792(11) (c) where insured is given an option of either
recovering under the endorsement-or of suing the tortfeasor(s), with
insurer's consent.
5 435 Pa. 456, 257 A.2d 550 (1969). One of the two insurers had attempted to
stay arbitration pending a judicial "determination" of the endorsement limits
which had inadvertently been left blank.
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former were binding in terms of normal contract law, to the extent
that a breach was subject to an action for damages, while the latter
were voidable by either party up to an actual submission to arbitration.6
Thus, in a jurisdiction applying the common law the arbitration provi-
sions cannot be specifically enforced if the issue is raised prior to sub-
mission. The rule is generally based on a reluctance to deprive the
parties of the safeguards of the judicial system.
Two states7 are reported to have no legislation modifying the above
common law attitude-in one of these, the arbitration terms were held
enforceable (Vermont) while in the second state (South Dakota) there
are no reported cases.8
Thirteen other states have modified this common law rule and now
specifically enforce the agreement, but only as to present disputes, where
it is assumed the parties are more aware of the consequences of their
agreement. Cases in these states thus refuse to enforce, up to the point
of the final submission to arbitration. (Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Utah.) Thus, in these fifteen states the uninsured
motorist arbitration agreement is unenforceable.
B. Statutory Arbitration Provisions
Many states prescribe various technical requirements intended to
promote an equal bargaining position and greater awareness on in-
sured's part of arbitration ramifications. For instance, Texas requires
that counsel for both parties sign the arbitration agreementY Other
states require insured or insurer to acknowledge, file, or execute a bond.
Rhode Island requires that the arbitration clause be placed near the
parties' signatures.0
The Uniform Arbitration Act or a substantially similar "modern
arbitration statute" has been enacted in eighteen of the remaining states.
Since these states either make no legislative reference to uninsured
motorist arbitration or have no uninsured motorist legislation at all,
enforceability as to future disputes hinges on the Uniform Act. (Alaska,
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming)."
The two remaining states (California and Oregon) have also adopt-
ed "modern arbitration laws" as above, but have also expressed the
6 5 Am. JuR. 2d, Arbitration & Award sec. 11.
7 This material as to the states is based on Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, 1969, at p. 174 et seq.
8 Widiss equates Okla. with Vt. here, but Okla. statutorily reinstated uninsured
motorist arbitration recently. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3636 (1969).
9 TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. Title 10, Art. 224 (1966).10 GEN. LAws § 10-3-2 (1956).
"1 N.H. Ray. STAT. § 268.8 (1966) merely refers to arbitration.
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arbitration provision in their respective uninsured motorist statutes.' 2
It is said therefore that legislative approval is reflected independent of
the general arbitration statutes in these two states.
C. Legislative and Administrative Provisions
3
Two cases present the issue of whether the Federal Arbitration
Act has application to arbitration proceedings under the uninsured
motorist endorsement.
Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,' 4 held uninsured motor-
ist arbitration to be unenforceable under Nebraska law as against the
state constitution and public policy. As to insurer's argument of en-
forceability based on the Federal Act, the court seemed to experience
no great difficulty.
Seaboard however claims that the federal arbitration act, 9 U.S.C.
sec. 1 et seq. applies. The federal act applies to contracts "evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitra-
tion a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract. .. .
9 U.S.C. sec. 2.
... (However) ...
It is the opinion of this court that the South Eastern Under-
writers case does not hold that individual contracts (of insur-
ance) are commerce.
The court found no case where the federal act had ever been applied
to an individual insurance contract, and without further reasoning held
that:
the federal arbitration act is inapplicable to this case .... How-
ever .... even if the federal arbitration act were applicable, the
defendant has waived.., arbitration.15
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic National Life Ins. Co.,16 was an
appeal from a judgment compelling arbitration of a dispute under a re-
insurance contract between two insurance companies. The contract
contained a "broad" commercial arbitration clause covering:
All disputes . . . upon which an amicable understanding cannot
be reached ... and the arbitrators shall place a liberal construc-
tion upon this agreement free from legal technicalities ...
In its attempt to avoid arbitration (and presumably payment on its
contract), Republic urged that arbitration was precluded under the
Federal Arbitration Act as to a reinsurance contract by virtue of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.'7 The court read the act more narrowly:
12 CAL. STATS. § 11580.2 et seq.; ORE. REV. STATS. §§ 743.78(6)-743.792.
139 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1947).
14285 F. Supp. 920 (D. Neb. 1968).
15 Ibid.
1c 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
27 15 U.S.C. 1011 et. seq.
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"(The McCarran Act) was not intended to preclude the applica-
tion of federal statutes to insurance unless they invalidate, im-
pair or supersede applicable state legislation regulating the busi-
ness of insurance." (District Court quote)
To avail itself of the McCarran Act, then, appellant must show
that the ... Arbitration Act would "invalidate, impair or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance." 15 USC Sec. 1012(b)
It is quite plain that arbitration statutes, including those of Texas
and New York, are not statutes regulating the business of insur-
sede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating
the method of handling contract disputes generally.18
In fact, the court endorsed arbitration here under the Federal Act,
but since a reinsurance contract was not viewed as the "business of in-
surance," there is no direct conflict with Booth. However, the above
language indicates the possibility of application to uninsured motorist
arbitration.
The value of an application of the Federal Act where arbitration is
already enforceable depends on the provisions of the endorsement.
From the standpoint, at least, of a party suing to vacate an award on
the grounds of bias or partiality, the Act does not seem to provide
much help.
In Catz American Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exchange,"9 a case
applying the Federal Act and involving commercial arbitration, Pearl
had the burden of clearly proving that the arbitrators engaged in con-
duct so "biased and prejudiced as to destroy the fundamental fairness"
of the proceeding.
Restrictive Legislative or State Insurance Commission Rules in
thirteen states prevent the insurer from enforcing arbitration. In eight
of these jurisdictions, the arbitration agreement may not even appear in
the endorsement. (Statute: Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia. Ins. Commission Rule:
Kentucky).
In five states, the provision may appear in the policy, even though
unenforceable against the insured (Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana,
Missouri and Nevada).
Insurance Commissioners' rules with respect to approval and filing
can, as with other policy terms, create an issue as to enforceability. 20
18 Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic National Life Ins. Co., supra note 16,
at 611.
19 292 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
20 Ellison v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Pa. Super. 492, 229 A.2d 482 (1967)
held arbitration not enforceable despite departmental action since it had no
legislative authority to issue arbitration regulations.
1970]
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D. Minor Unnamed Insured
It is reported that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are gen-
erally not enforceable against minors."' Cases are said to turn generally
on specific statutory reference to minors.
Where a minor institutes arbitration, however, it has been held that
he could not later disclaim the award. 2
E. Enforcement By Insured
Enforcement not by insurer but by insured presents the issue of
whether the insurer is bound even in jurisdictions where it has been
held that the insured is not bound. To the mutuality objection, Widiss
responds with the analogy of the rule of construction of ambiguous
policy terms against the insurer.23 One approach is a Louisiana Statute
providing that submission to arbitration shall be optional with the as-
sured.2 4
Such statutes apparently reflect legislative doubt as to whether the
insured can ever be bound by an agreement to arbitrate as it exists in
the uninsured motorist endorsement. Widiss takes the view that under
current insurance marketing conditions, such an agreement cannot be
truly voluntary, and that it can be attacked on a contract of adhesion
basis.2 5 However, such charges can of course be leveled against nearly
every insurance policy provision and it does not seem clear that the
arbitration provisions can be successfully distinguished in this regard.2 6
F. Waiver By the Insurera4
As stated in the introduction to this section, even where arbitration
is enforceable, the insurer by its conduct may be deemed to have waived
its right to enforce arbitration; or more properly, to have waived the
right to assert the arbitration provision as a defense against insured's
action where the assertion was not timely made. The question of whether
215 Aas. JUR. 2d, Arbitration and Award § 62 (1962); Chernick v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 264, 187 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959) aff'd, 8
N.Y.2d 756, 201 N.Y.S.2d 774, 168 N.E.2d 110, Annot. 24 A.L.R.3d 1337,
78 A.L.R.2d 1288 (1960); Dickson v. Hoffman, 305 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Kan.
1969); Hickey v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 239 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn.
1965); Kessler v. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co., 218 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct.
1961). See also Short v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 307 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W.Va.
1969) where arbitration was said to be unenforceable against plaintiff, a
minor third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract.
22 Fernandez v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 224 So. 2d 724 (Fla. App. 1969).
23 Widiss, supra note 7, at 197.24 LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 22.1406(d) (5).
25 Widiss, supra note 7, at 189.
26 Widiss, supra note 7, at 187.
27 A contract right to enforce may be waived, before or after commencement of
suit, by express words or necessary implication from conduct not consistent
with a claim that the parties were obligated-in this context, to arbitrate.
For example, a general answer failing to assert the right to arbitrate, a denial
that there is anything to arbitrate, and slowness in performing required pre-
liminary steps can result in waiver. 5 AMi. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award
§ 51 (1962).
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there has been a waiver is typically raised in the insured's complaint in
an action against its insurer. Where there is sufficient evidence, the
issue of waiver goes to the jury. Thus, waiver has been found where
the insurer neglected to press for arbitration in the face of insured's
suit which had been pending for two years,28 and in another case where
the insurer allowed insured's suit against the uninsured motorist to
reach judgment and insured's suit on the judgment against insurer to
commence, all with full knowledge.2 9
However, mere knowledge on the part of the insurer of activities
of its insured which are inconsistent with, or contrary to the arbitration
agreement may not be sufficient to support a waiver. This is especially
true where the court stresses that the duty-or opportunity- to press
for arbitration was mutual.30
Conversely, where insurer did not have timely knowledge of its in-
sured's inconsistent activities, a jury finding of waiver has been over-
turned.3 '
A waiver has also been implied on the basis of insurer's affirmative
conduct. In Schramm v. Dotz,32 the Wisconsin court held that by seek-
ing a dismissal over an extended period of time rather than indicating a
desire for arbitration, the insurer waived its right to insist on arbitra-
tion. Schramm collided with the defendant uninsured motorist in No-
vember, 1959, and their negotiations were to no avail. In September of
1961, Schramm sued his uninsured motorist insurer Badger Mutual
and the uninsured motorist. Trial was eventually set for February 5,
1963. On Feb. 1, insurer procured an order to show cause why its
affirmative defense (arbitration) raised in its answer should not be
tried separately. Insurer's affidavit alleged that no arbitration demand
had even been made. This motion, as well as trial motions to dismiss
and for directed verdict were denied. The Supreme Court, in finding
waiver, pointed out that Ch. 298 constituted a set of exclusive remedies
for enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, which was not enforceable
at common law.
28Poray v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 454, 217 A.2d 916 (1966);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 177 So. 2d 47 (Fla. App.
1965).
29 Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 285 F. Supp. 920 (D. Neb. 1968)
dicta.
30 Chernick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 264, 187
N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959) aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 756, 201 N.Y.S.2d 774, 168 N.E.2d 110
(1960); Niazi v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 121 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1963);
but see Bielski v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 379 Mich. 280, 150 N.W.2d 788 (1967).
33 Riley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372 (6 Cir. 1970).
32 23 Wis. 2d 678, 127 N.W.2d 779 (1964) ; see also Kelly v. Citizens Mut. Ins.
Co., 19 Mich. App. 177, 172 N.W.2d 537 (1969) ; Government Employees Ins.
Co. v. Whitaker, 218 So. 2d 198 (Fla. App. 1969). Contribution uncertainties
led insurer to falsely assert non-receipt of required records, for purposes
of delay.
19701
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By providing for a stay pending arbitration, the statute (Sec.
298.02) implicitly denies the validity of a provision that no action
may be brought until arbitration has been had. . . . Defendant
had a clear right to a stay... (But) defendant at no time moved
the court for a statutory stay. It consistently and repeatedly sought
dismissal. . . . It maintained this position for an extended per-
iod.... .s
Where the policy provided arbitration under the American Arbitra-
tion Association Rules, and the insurer had refused to join AAA, thus
requiring insured to pay a $250 filing fee instead of the usual $50, in-
surer was held to have waived its right to compel arbitration.3 4
G. Waiver by Insured
The above principles apply, of course, with equal effect against the
insured. Thus, the insured does not waive his right to compel arbitra-
tion by bringing action against the uninsured motorist contrary to the
permission to sue clause if he had no knowledge of the other motorist's
uninsured status.3 5
H. Other Acts
Insureds were held not to have waived arbitration where insured's
counsel made an agreement during arbitration, which was continued
pending the outcome in a related suit, that if judgment in the related
suit became final it would defeat the arbitration claim.38
However, where insureds gave a release to insurer of all claims
under uninsured motorist coverage and later commenced suit despite
the release, on the basis of after-discovered injuries, the release was
held to be a waiver of arbitration by insureds.37
I. Waiver of Conditions Precedent Defenses
Generally, an insured is under a duty to cooperate with his insurer.
As elements of this duty are conditions precedent to recovery under the
policy as a whole: notice of accident, proof of loss, submission to medi-
cal examination, submission to examination under oath, and consent to
the obtaining of medical information.
33 Schram v. Dotz, 23 Wis. 2d 678 at 682, 127 N.W.2d 779 (1964).
34 Hall v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 224 (Fla. App. 1966).
35In Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp. v. McTootle, 236 N.Y.S.2d 588
(Sup. Ct. 1963) upon discovery of tortfeasor's uninsured status, insured
dropped the suit by stipulation and demanded arbitration. Waiver was said
to be an intentional abandonment of a known right, and no prejudice to in-
surer was shown. Accord: Mailman v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp.,
36 Misc. 2d 825, 235 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Application of Travelers
Indem. Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d 718, aff'd 246 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1962); McGorman v.
Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 285 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1962) where mere
institution of suit not waiver, but continued action over two years in face of
disclaimer held to constitute waiver; Scheck v. Motor Vehicle Accident In-
dem. Corp., 243 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1967) where waiver found where insured had
knowledge of right to arbitration prior to suit.36 Loscalzo v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1964).
3 Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Copeland, 56 Cal. Rptr. 794 (Ct. App.
1967).
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As stated in the introduction to this Section, insurer's right to assert
these unfulfilled conditions may generally be waived by the initiation of
arbitration where insurer partakes in the proceedings.3 s However, where
the insurer preserves its demand in its arbitration pleadings, and the
condition precedent is a continuing one, there may be no vaiver 9
II SCOPE OF ARBITRATION
Among the states where arbitration is enforceable, a further ques-
tion arises as to whether the various issues which arise between the
insured, the uninsured motorist, and the uninsured motorist carrier
may-or must-be resolved by either arbitration or court adjudication.
The question usually arises prior to arbitration, and turns on a con-
struction of the insured's policy language as to what in fact was the
agreement of the parties.40 This determination can also be affected by
public policy considerations favoring or disfavoring arbitration in gen-
eral, fears of a "flood of peacemeal litigation," or a deference to appar-
ent legislative wishes.
A. Literal or Restrictive Construction
A literal construction of the standard arbitration provisions limits the
arbitrator's jurisdiction to:
1. Whether insured is legally entitled to recover from owner or
operator of the uninsured motorist vehicle, excluding other
issues under other terms in the endorsement(or policy as a
whole), such as coverage, and condition precedent issues, and
2. Amount of damages.
The problem, of course, is in delineating exactly which issues are
subsumed thereunder. The usual approach is to regard "coverage" ques-.
tions as precedent to the above issues of liability and damages. Thus,
it is said that until it is established that the policy covers the event of
the accident, or that certain conditions precedent to recovery have not
been violated, a consideration of liability or damages is premature.
Among the issues which have accordingly been held to be "coverage"
questions are:
a. Whether claimant was an "insured" or an "occupant" under
the policy.
b. Whether the bodily injuries were "caused by accident."
c. Whether the other vehicle was in fact uninsured.
d. Whether tortfeasor's insurer disclaimed liability.
e. Whether the other vehicle was a 'hit-and-run" vehicle, wheth-
er there was physical contact with such other vehicle, or
whether the other driver's identity was ascertainable.
3s Progressive Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 229 So. 2d 645 (Fla. App. 1969).
39 Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 110 Ill. App. 2d 307, 249 N.E.2d 190 (1969).
40 Note 1 supra. Such language can vary in different policies, of course. This
problem has arisen in California where different policy and statutory language
has seemed to breed confusion in successive cases.
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f. Whether claimant met his duties under the policy, such as
timely notice to the insurer.
g. Whether a statute of limitations bars the claim.
h. Whether "other insurance" negates insurer's liability.
41
Frequently in these situations the insurer wishes to resolve the
"coverage" question after its insured has already demanded or com-
menced arbitration. The success of the insurer's attempt then to secure
a judicial stay of arbitration often turns on procedural issues of proper
timing and form.
42
B. New York: Limited Jurisdiction
One of the first decisions in the country to squarely meet the issue
of scope, Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co. of N. Y.,43 has become the
most oft-cited representative of the literal interpretation cases. The
decision has since been followed in New York-a state generating per-
haps more uninsured motorist arbitration cases than all other states
combined. The opinion and its dissent enumerate arguments which have
found their way into every subsequent case which faced the issue.
Plaintff's insured husband died as a result of being struck by an
allegedly uninsured motorist. She and her husband were covered by a
policy including a standard uninsured motorist endorsement.
She sued the uninsured motorist, who defaulted. Her claim under
the endorsement met with insurer's denial of liability, and she then
moved for an order compelling arbitration, supported by an affidavit
alleging the tortfeasor's uninsured status. Special Term ultimately
ordered a jury trial as to whether decedent had been struck by an un-
41 Widiss, supra note 7, at 206.
42 Several recent New York cases have rejected attempts to stay an arbitration
because statutory requirements as to form and timing were not complied
with. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432
(1969) ; Jonathan Logan Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 31 App. Div.
2d 208, 295 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1968) commercial arbitration; Boxill v. Motor
Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 33 App. Div. 2d 13, 304 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1969)
stay refused despite technical violation of timely notice to police of hit and
run; but see Medica v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 32 App. Div.
2d 771, 301 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1969) where permanent stay granted since party
failed to show reasonableness of delay; General Accident Fire and Life Assur.
Corp. Ltd. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223, (Sup. Ct. 1969)
statutory stay time limit cannot be waived by parties' agreement; Cosmopoli-
tan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moliere, 31 App. Div. 2d 924, 298 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1969).
Service of the stay was upheld where conforming with AAA Rule 30 (by
mail) despite a contrary procedural statute in Bauer v. Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Indem. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1969). N.B. The
Accident Claims Rules of the American Arbitration Assoc. have been con-
densed and re-written, effective as of January 1, 1970. No substantial change
was made.
Two New York cases seem to be conflicting as to whether failure to stay
arbitration in time precluded the insurer from raising a coverage issue. All-
state Ins. Co. v. Ness, 32 App. Div. 2d 912, 302 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1969) ten day
time limit-C.P.L.R. Sec. 7503(c) ; Frame v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
31 App. Div. 2d 872, 297 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1969) ten day limit expressed in the
arbitration demand.
43 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667 (1962).
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insured motorist., and if so, that arbitration proceed. The Appellate Di-
vision reversed. The Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision,
agreed with Special Term:
The policy endorsement did not cover all controversies between
insured and insurer. It ... made arbitrable two fact issues only:
as to fault ("legally entitled") and as to damages if fault should
be established.
The arbitration clause was particular, not general.
"No one is under a duty to resort to arbitration unless by clear
language he has so agreed."
Where the covenant to arbitrate is made subject to conditions
precedent, the existance of such conditions when disputed is an
issue for the court.
The Dissent urged that:
The arbitration clause in . . . clear language, provides that:
"The matter or nmatters upon which the insured and company
do not agree shall be settled by arbitration." (emphasis supplied
by the Court)
The phrase "mnatter or matters" . . . is certainly explicit
enough.... We should not read into that agreement a provision
for piecemeal treatment of a specified area of dispute by two
separate and distinct procedures. . . . (W) e will be adding a
new type of cause to an already overburdened court calendar....
The policy endorsement was drawn by the company for which
the insured paid an extra premium and now finds, six years after
the fatal injury, that she has not yet been able to pin the company
down .... 41
The Rosenbaum case, resolving the earlier split in New York, has
been followed in principle in Colorado, 45 Connecticut, Illinois and Mich-
igan.
C. Connecticut
In Frager v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins Co.,48 and Viselli v. American
Fidelity Co.,4 7 the Connecticut Supreme Court clearly established that
the physical contact issue was not arbitrable under the standard en-
dorsement. The court found that the proper procedure in resolving
non-arbitrable issues was to sue in court, prior to arbitration, to have
not only the arbitrability of the issue, but also the "coverage" issue
itself resolved. In Frager, the court rejected a warning of a flood of
unwarranted and piecemeal litigation. Both cases arose out of pro-
ceedings prior to arbitration.
44 Id. at 670.
45 International Service Ins. Co., v. Ross, 457 P2d 917 (Colo. 1969).46231 A.2d 531 (Conn. 1967).
47 237 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1967).
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D. Illinois
Two cases in early 1968 placed Illinois firmly within the narrow
approach to arbitral jurisdiction. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Loring,48
an intermediate level decision, held that the physical contact issue
must be arbitrated, in the procedural manner outlined in the Connecti-
cut cases above. The Supreme Court, in Flood v. Country Mut. Ins.
Co.,4 9 reversed an intermediate court and held the issue whether claim-
ant was an insured person under the policy to be non-arbitrable. As a
case of "first impression," it cited as support Michigan and Connecticut
cases, and the New York Rosenbaum case. The Connecticut-type pro-
cedure was prescribed.
Di Carlo v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 0 where insured attempted
to enforce arbitration under the ad hoc type provision, is discussed at
p. 430.
E. Michigan
In Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Strange,51 defendant was driving
insured's auto and was struck by another auto which had been side-
swiped by one Sharp, who fled. Insured's policy was standard. Defend-
ant filed an arbitration demand, and plaintiff filed a declaratory relief
complaint, in that coverage issues existed and were not arbitrable.
"Since the only arbitrable matters are those specified in the in-
surance contract ... we must look at the language.
Interpretations of this, or similar, language have not been pre-
sented to the Michigan Supreme Court. Under a similar arbitra-
tion provision . . . New York held in Rosenbaum . . . that
(whether the vehicle was uninsured) was for court determina-
tion. This interpretation was adopted by the Superior Court of
Connecticut. . . . It appeals to us as reasonable and proper,
and we adopt it .... 52
F. California: "Expanded" Jurisdiction
It has been claimed that California cases represent the view that all
or nearly all issues arising between the parties are arbitrable, on the
basis of three rationales:
1. Strong legislative policy as seen in fact that the California
Insurance Code (11580.2) expressly calls for arbitration.
(Only one other state, Oregon, has legislated the standard ar-
bitration language into its insurance statutes.
5 3
2. Public policy generally favoring arbitration.
3. Fear of a flood of "piecemeal litigation."
4891111. App. 2d 372, 235 N.E.2d 418 (1968).
4941 Ill. App. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 149 (1968).
50 82 II. App. 2d 414, 226 N.E.2d 514 (1967).
513 Mich. App. 733, 143 N.W.2d 572 (1966).
52 Id. at 574.
53 ORE. REV. STATS. §§ 743.783-743.792.
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A reading of the California cases makes that state's inclusion in this
category doubtful, however. Four California cases have been cited
standing for an unlimited jurisdiction: American Ins. Co. v. Gernand,54
Esparza v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.;55 Federal Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schermerhorn;56 Jordan v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co. 5 7 It has been implied
that these cases represent the view of the state's highest court, while
the cases reflecting a more limited view or arbitral jurisdiction are the
unreviewed work of intermediate courts.58
The distinction made in Widiss between the stated scope of arbitral
jurisdiction on the one hand, and the further question of which "cover-
age" issues lie outside the stated scope on the other hand, is useful in a
comparison of the New York and California cases. Generally it can be
said that the New York cases prescribe a narrow scope of arbitral
jurisdiction and enumerate coverage issues which lie outside this scope,
whereas California cases often (though not always) espouse a widened
scope, while at the same time enumerating many of the same "coverage"
issues as outside the scope. Thus, while the results in California and
in New York have seemed in accord, both states can easily be distin-
guished in this connection from Pennsylvania. 9
54 68 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1968).
5 65 Cal. Rptr. 245 (Ct. App. 1968).
56 48 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
5742 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
58 See Widiss, note 7 at 210-11. The Jordan case exemplifies a critical distinction
important though at times unrecognized in these cases: It is one thing to hold,
as in Jordan, that a "coverage" issue is arbitrable when it has been volun-
tarily submitted by the parties for arbitration; but it is another matter to
hold that the issue must in all events be arbitrated, whether submitted volun-
tarily or not. It is true that Jordan was a Supreme Court case, and that much
of its language seems to prescribe an all-inclusive arbitration, but the Court
took care to establish the fact of a voluntary submission by both parties of
the issue of whether the tortfeasor was uninsured.
Esparza in turn was an intermediate court decision. Moreover, the court
seemed to rely on language in the arbitration clause before it, which was
somewhat broader than that in the standard endorsement-a difference noted
in Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 749, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 721 (1966).
The Gernand case was also an intermediate court decision, in fact heard
by the same court that decided Esparza (2nd Dist. Ct. of App. Div. 1). There
was little fresh reasoning, and the opinion cited and seemed to rest on the
earlier Jordan and Esparna cases.
In Federal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schermerhorn, another intermediate level
opinion (First District Court of App. Div. 2), a coverage question was
raised by the insurer as to a policy held by the allegedly uninsured motorist,
and insurer filed a declaratory action on the issue, asking for a preliminary
injunction stopping the AAA hearings. The insurer lost the issue, but the
injunction was granted. On appeal, the court decided to dissolve the injunc-
tion, pointing out that subrogation would be available to the insurer, that
insurer admitted to insured's right to arbitration, and that the issue of the
uninsured status of the tortfeasor was arbitrable. The court cited Jordan,
which bad been rendered after the instant injunction was granted. Thus, this
case does support a wide view of scope, but it does not carry a great deal of
independent weight.
59 See discussion below at 425.
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The confusion in California has not gone entirely unnoticed in that
state's appellate opinions. The court in Hernandez v. State Farm Ins.
Co.6° observed that, after all, the words of the statutory policy endorse-
ment are clear on their face in allowing only the issues of liability and
damages as within proper arbitral jurisdiction, and enumerated sup-
port for its view. 61 In Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co.,"2 a different Court
of Appeal reaffirmed the earlier philosophy of the Jordan line of cases,
and expressly asked for Supreme Court guidance:
... (W)e find an increasing number of uninsured motorist de-
cisions which have removed legal and factual issues from the
arbitrators and transferred them to the courts.
The kaleidoscopic pattern of decisions in this field must certain-
ly be a difficult one for trial courts and arbitration tribunals to
interpret.63
60 77 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Cal. App. 1969).
61 The court affirmed a denial of a petition to vacate an award, holding that
insureds had waived whatever right they may have had to a court adjudica-
tion of the "coverage" question of physical contact. Insureds had voluntarily
submitted the issue, and had offered proof on its merits at the hearing. Citing
Esparza and Gernand on the same coverage question, the court acknowledged
some doubt as to whether insureds could have been compelled to submit the
issue the court stated that:
"The problem is that section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code provides for
arbitration of just two issues: 1. whether the insured is legally entitled
to recover damages; and 2. the amount thereof. Thus, unless the right
to a judicial determination is waived by proceeding to arbitration, the
following issues between insurer and insured have been held not to be
arbitrable: Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lang, 265 Cal. App. 2d-(265
A.C.A. 946,952), 71 Cal. Rptr. 637 (factual question of contract);
Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 260 Cal. App. 2d 105, 67 Cal. Rptr.
175 (policy limits) ; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Ruiz, 250 Cal. App. 2d 741,
745-746, 59 Cal. Rptr. 13 (question whether injured person additional
assured) ; Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Copeland, 248
Cal. App. 2d 561, 564-565, 56 Cal. Rptr. 794 (legal effect of release). Cf.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orlando, 262 Cal. App. 2d 858, 865, 69 Cal. Rptr. 702;
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d 63, 66-68, 54
Cal. Rptr. 470; and Aetna Cas. Surety Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal.
App. 2d 333, 339-340, 43 Cal. Rptr. 476, all holding that the timeliness
of a demand for arbitration under Section 11580.2(h) is not arbitrable."
Several other cases support a narrow view of arbitral jurisdiction:
Key Ins. Exch. v. Biagini, 58 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Cal. App. 1967); Niagara
Fire Ins. Co. v. Cole, 44 Cal. Rptr. 889 (Cal. App. 1965); Calhoun v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1967);
Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Cokg 52 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Cal. App.
1966) where however an exceptionally wide scope was read into the
endorsement words "... or do not agree as to the amount payable
hereunder."
62 86 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). In this 2nd Dist., Div. 2 case, the insurer had dis-
claimed liability at the arbitration hearing alleging a lack of physical contact.
After hearing the evidence, the arbitrator found physical contact. In opposing
confirmation, the insurer demanded the right to a de novo evidentiary hear-
ing on the issue. The Court of Appeal found, however, that the issue was
within the submission agreement of the parties as denoted in the statutory
policy language. In any event, the court added, the insurer waived any defect
in arbitral jurisdiction when it submitted the issue at the arbitration hearing.
63 Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., supra at 182.
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G. Pennsylvania: Unlimited Jurisdiction
Recent cases reaffirm that in Pennsylvania seemingly any issue
arising between the insured and his uninsured motorist carrier must
be arbitrated.
In Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Arbit. Ass'n, 64 after re-
ceiving the arbitration demand, insurer filed a complaint seeking pre-
liminary injunction restraining arbitration, arguing that a statute of
limitations issue required court determination. To distinguish ihe earli-
er Kunn6 5 case (whether tortfeasor was uninsured is arbitrable) and
the Medycki"6 case (whether proof of loss requirement was fulfiilled
is arbitable), insurer argued that the instant issue of violation of the
policy notice provision applied to the entire policy. The court ag-eed,
but insisted that arbitration of the issue would affect only the uninsured
motorist coverage in the policy.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Taylor,67 a court decree holding a son not to
be a resident of insured father's household was vacated, and the petition
for declaratory judgment was ordered dismissed. It was held by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the issue was within the scope of
arbitration, even though the insurer has stipulated to insured's request
for a judicial determination of the issue.
Great American Ins. Co. v. American Arbit. Assoc.6s is also instruc-
tive as to the evolving arbitration procedure in Pennsylvania. Where an
injured taxicab passenger, whose insurer later became insolvent, de-
manded arbitration under her brother's policy, it was agreed to arbi-
trate in two parts: The first to decide coverage; the second, if coverage
was found, to decide damages. Insurers' attempt to enjoin the second
part was denoted as "a patent attempt . . . to evade the dictates of
a long series of recent cases in this Court dealing with the arbitration
clause. . . ." Insurer urged misconduct in the first hearing. In affirm-
ing, the court recited the rule that only fraud, misconduct, or corruption
such that results in an unjust, inequitable and unconscionable award
would suffice, and that none had been shown. The court added that the
only proper form of review of arbitration was a petition to vacate an
award-and that here no award had yet been rendered.
64248 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1969).
65 National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 428 Pa. 179, 236 A.2d 758 (1968).
66 Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 244 A.2d 655 (1968).
67 434 Pa. 21, 252 A.2d 618 (1969).
68 260 A.2 769 (Pa. 1969) ; See also Preferred Risk Aut. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 260
A.2d 804 (Pa. 1970) ; Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Barr, 435 Pa. 456, 257
A.2d 550 (1969) ; Gulf Ins. Co. v. American Arbitration Association & Smith,
311 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Significantly, Pennsylvania has enjoyed
success under its compulsory arbitration plan, in effect since 1958. and appli-
cable to all civil claims for amounts of $3000 and under. The plan was in-
tended primarily to reduce court congestion. A treatment of this scheme and
its effect on uninsured motorist arbitration in Pennsylvania is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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H. Florida
Although Florida is said to have represented the narrower New
York view, in a 1965 case the court affirmed a jury resolution not only
on one of the "coverage" issues, but also, in the same trial, the liability
and damage issues. 69 Here and in later cases, then, insurer's denial of
coverage in some respect would act as a waiver of arbitration. Indeed,
Widiss suggests that either party can eliminate arbitration at will
merely by raising a coverage-type issue.7 0 A recent case supports this
view:
Insured filed an "unsworn" complaint in a Florida District Court
alleging that insurer had denied that its policy coverage of $10,000 on
each of three insured autos owned by insured would be available. In-
surer filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, with affidavit
admitting the fact of and extent of coverage of $30,000. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed for insurer with directions to compel arbitra-
tion, distinguishing earlier cases where coverage had been in issue.7 1
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
A court can affect arbitration proceedings generally at either of two
points-before or after. (Though we noted in Pennsylvania, where
arbitration can be a split affair, that the court entered the picture in the
"half-time break.")
Once arbitration is concluded, the standard form endorsement.2
simply states that a judgment on the arbitration award may be entered
in any court having jurisdiction, and that insured and insurer agree
to be bound by the properly-made award. A court, then, may be asked
to vacate, modify, or confirm an award, or may order a remand for
either a lower court adjudication or another arbitration hearing.73 Court
activities at this latter stage are the subject of this section. 74
Initially, it is useful to note the importance of the elements of law
discussed in previous sections of this paper as they affect the exercise
of judicial review of arbitration proceedings. We can note where, for
instance, the wording of a particular arbitration clause and the scope
of arbitral jurisdiction accorded thereunder affect the outcome on re-
69 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 177 So. 2d 47 (Fla. App.
1965).
70 Widiss, supra note 7, at 213.
7' Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Phillips, 230 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) ; The
"narrow" view is supported by Hilton v. Citizens Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 904 (Fla.
App. 1967); See also Prudence Mut. Cas. Co. v. Humphreys, 220 So. 2d 381
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
72 The State Farm arbitration clause is silent.
7i 5 However, see statute providing a version of an arbitration reference to a
court at arbitrator's or party's request for binding decision on a law issue.
NEv. REv. STATs. § 38.14074 Another aspect of judicial review not treated here is the preliminary question
of whether court rulings compelling or staying arbitration or staying suit pend-
ing arbitration are themselves appealable. See Lawyers' Arbitration Letter,
Appealable Orders, American Arbitration Association, No. 38 (May 15, 1969).
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view. Also, review is affected by the terms of a state's general arbitra-
tion statutes, where applicable, which usually prescribe some grounds
for the vacating or modification of arbitration awards. Also, arbitra-
tion rules can have a crucial impact where they are incorporated into
the policy (as are AAA Rules).
The earlier discussion of common law arbitration might also be
recalled here. It has been said that, where a state has enacted a version
of the Uniform Arbitration Act and the state's insurance code is silent
as to arbitration, the provisions of the Act are applied.7 5 However,
this is not universally true. In Owens v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co.,-M
insurer appealed from a confirmation of claimant's AAA award, urging
that the insured motorist endorsement had been rejected when the
policy was issued, thus subtracting from the insurance contract any
provision for arbitration. The majority and the dissent disagreed as to
whether insurer waived this "pre-arbitral legal issue" by appearing at
the hearing and defending on the merits. The majority decided that
where no reference to arbitration appears in a contract, judicial review
of arbitration is to base itself, not on the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act,
but on the common law arbitration rules-which clearly require a wai-
ver of all 'pre-award "procedural defects." the Court stated the test
to be met under the common law for vacatur:
If the appeal is from a common law award, appellant, to succeed,
must show by clear, precise and indubitable evidence that he was
denied a hearing, or that there was fraud, misconduct, corruption
or some other irregularity of this nature on the part of the arbi-
trator which caused him to render an unjust, inequitable and
unconscionable award, the arbitrator being the final judge of
both law and fact, his award not being subject to disturbance
for a mistake of either.
77
Common law arbitration can also, when applied, affect the formali-
ties of confirmation of an award.
7 8
75 See also Wis. STATs. ANN. § 298.10 (1967).
7 210 Pa. Super. 235, 232 A.2d 14 (1967). Generally, see Aksen, Judicial Review
of Uninsured-Motorist Arbitration Awards, 48 ORE. L. Rmv. 74 (1968).
77 Owens v. Concord, supra at 16. In Carpenter v. North River Ins. Co., 436
S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. 1968) the court noted that:(I)t is almost uniformly held that the statutory (arbitration act) remedy
is cumulative and the common law remedy remains available to those
who choose to use it.
The court enforced an award here on a common law basis despite the
exclusion of insurance contracts from the Texas Arbitration Act, where both
parties volunteered to arbitrate.
78 Smith v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Pa. Super. 83, 239 A.2d 824 (1968),
held that the Clerk of Court lacks power to reduce the award to judgment
without a previous entry of judgment by a court. Bartilucci v. Safeguard Mut.
Ins. Co., 212 Pa. Super. 414, 242 A2d 916 (1968), held, in turn, that a judg-
ment could be entered by a court on a common law award without requiring
the parties to bring a separate suit in assumpsit. Both cases, of course were
focused on the standard endorsement language "judgment upon any award
rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."
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A. Grounds for Vacatur or Modification
That the arbitrator has erred in law or fact or exceeded his powers
is a basis for review-though reportedly seldom successful. As in the
case of normal judicial appellate review, it is clear that more is needed
than a mere showing that the reviewer would have decided the matter
differently. 79
Brewer v. Allstate Ins. Co.80 held for instance that a mistake of
law or fact was not such an excess of powers, noting the Oregon
Statute granting arbitrator the power "to decide both the law and
facts involved in the case" and also asserting that, since the "principal
purpose of arbitration is to avoid litigation," judicial review was to be
confined "to the strictest possible limits.' 'The problem in Brewer was
that the AAA arbitration placed the burden of proving the uninsured
motorist to be in fact uninsured on the claimant. The Court clearly
disagreed, but left the award undisturbed.
Similarly, in Interinsurance Exchange v. Bailes,8 ' no excess of power
was found where arbitrator's findings of fact were different from a
court's in a prior declaratory relief action. Insured's plea of res judicata
was denied.
We saw earlier that the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction can
be an issue for judicial determination before, after, and even during
the arbitration proceeedings. Two Illinois cases for example, vacated
an award where the arbitrator exceeded his authority and decided
"coverage" issues held beyond the proper scope.81
In Smaglia v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,83 the arbitrator's error was
his rejection as "unnecessary" medical testimony relevant and impor-
tant to a proper finding of decedent's future earnings. In remanding
for another arbitration, the court denoted the conduct "a denial of a
full and fair hearing, which warranted vacating an award even at com-
mon law." (Emphasis supplied)
In Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Decaturs4 an award
was vacated where the arbitrator exceeded his authority in rendering
an award on a wrongful death claim where demand for arbitration had
not been filed within the required two years. The court noted that
"there are certain legal rights . . . which the parties cannot waive ......
79 Brewer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 436 P.2d 547 (Ore. 1968); Barbuto v. Motor
Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 927, 289 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1968).
so Ibid; See also Allen v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Calif., 80
Cal. Rptr. 247 (Ct. App. 1969).
8133 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1963).
82 Safeway Ins. Co. v. Parker, 105 Ill. App. 2d 208, 245 N.E.2d 75 (1969) (physi-
cal contact) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 243 N.E.2d 5 (Ill. App. 1969)
(other insurance provision). Nevada upheld an award in similar circumstances
involving coverage issues, where the parties were found to have voluntarily
submitted. Northwestern Security Ins. Co. v. Clark, 448 P.2d 39 (Nev. 1968).83432 Pa. 133, 247 A.2d 577 (1968).
84 109 Ill. App. 2d 133, 248 N.E.2d 299 (1969).
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The time limit was termed a "condition to the right to sue and ... not
merely a statute of limitation ... which a defendant may interpose or
waive as he sees fit."
The fact that an award is merely inadequate or excessive is rarely
a successful basis of ,review. In Torano v. MVAIC, 5 a young widow
with two children was awarded $500. (Her husband collided with a
bridge abutment before being struck by the uninsured motorist). Aksen
finds no cases where insurer tried to have an award reduced-but then
the limits are usually only 10/20.6 Insurers, of course, often argue on
the basis of endorsement provisions for medical payments, workmen's
compensation, and other offsets.
Another ground for review occasionally appearing is the failure to
grant general damages as well as specials. In reversing the affirmation
of an award on this basis, California noted statutory language requir-
ing "a determination of all questions submitted to the arbitrators ...
necessary to determine the controversy."87 General damages were re-
garded as a part of the complete controversy. The new insurance code
of Oregon would more expressly support this result in stating that
insurer is to pay sums which insured is legally entitled to recover as
"general and special damages from the owner. ... "I'll
Another basis for review is a finding of lack of impartiality-for
instance, failure to disclose an objectionable relationship. This latter
is especially pertinent where AAA rules apply, since these rules require
disclosure of "any circumstances likely to create a presumption of
bias .. ",,9
Violations of AAA Rules, excepting the "failure to disclose" rule
mentioned above, rarely support a successful action to vacate. In
Murry v. Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., 0 the court decided to over-
look a violation of the rule against communication between the arbi-
trator and a party occurring before service on both parties to the formal
award, along with a violation of Rule 36 in that the award was never
actually served.
Other instances of violation have resulted in vacatur, however. In
Smith v. Northwest Schools, Inc.,1 failure to render the award within
the required thirty days under AAA rules constituted sufficient
85 19 App. Div. 2d 356, 243 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1963) aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 882, 206 N.E.2d
353 (1965).
86 Aksen, supra note 77, at 85.
87 Banks v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1966).
88 ORE. Rv. STAT. § 743.792(1) (a).8 9 Merolla v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 231 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup.
Ct. 1629) where arbitrator was undisclosed counsel of record in Motor Vehicle
Accident Indem. Corp. member insurer company, vacatur granted. The posi-
tion of arbitrator was described as "a quasi-judicial position." See also Del
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 32 App. Div. 2d 1060, 303 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1969).
90 62 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1967).
91 N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 3, 1969).
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grounds under the applicable New York statutes for vacatur, where
AAA's request for an extension of time was refused in writing by a
party before he received the late award. In Karaskiewicz v. Allstate
Ins. Co.,92 the arbitrator, on request, accepted a memorandum after
hearings had closed without an official reopening of hearings. (AAA
rules 26, 27) The Court held that a variance in these agreed-upon pro-
cedures was sufficient for vacatur, though it denied this remedy on
other grounds.
Ex-Parte Arbitration, where a party refuses to attend the hearings,
at times results in a default award. The AAA procedures allow for this,
and it has been upheld in commercial and labor cases. Di Carlo v. State
Farm Auto Ins. Co.93 is instructive as to ad hoc arbitration in this
connection.
Aksen also reminds us that there must be a valid arbitration provi-
sion. For instance, Ellison v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co.94 shows a suc-
cessful attack on a default arbitration award, where insurer argued
that neither a state insurance arbitration regulation (standard language
-AAA) nor judicial action could create arbitration where both the
statutes and the policy were silent. Insurer therefore had no duty to
arbitrate and never consented to or appeared at the hearing.
It is conceded that it is the option of the arbitrator whether to pro.
vide "findings" or reasoning to support the award. Therefore, such
findings or their absence become a basis for review only where they
furnish counsel with other grounds for objection. For instance, while
the court did not vacate the award in International Service Ins. Co. v.
Ross,9 6 it vacated a judgment confirming the award and remanded for a
trial on the merits of insurer's defenses relating to policy exclusions,
proof of claim, and medical reports. The court found that the lack of a
record of the hearing and the absence of indication in the award and
lower court judgment that these defenses were properly considered
made remand necessary. There had been two separate arbitrations, one
of which was ex parte as to the insurer.
An interesting New York case, Mole v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 7
disposed of several arguments as to whether freshly discovered evidence
can be a basis for a vacatur or modification. The court found that it
had no power to receive a motion to vacate on these grounds, and, based
on the doctrine of "functus officio" ("a task performed") ruled that an
arbitrator was precluded from any further action once an award was
made. The court pointed out that the location of fresh evidence was
92109 Ill. App. 2d 370, 248 N.E.2d 756 (1969).
93 82 Ill. App. 2d 414, 226 N.E.2d 514 (1967).
94 209 Pa. Super. 492, 229 A.2d 482 (1967).
95 Brewer v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 79.
96457 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1969).
9714 App. Div. 2d 1, 217 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1961).
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not among the exchive statutory grounds in New York on motion to
vacate. Further, the court found no general power to grant equitable
relief here. Also, the statute granting a "new trial" on the grounds of
fresh evidence was distinguished, with the obvious reminder that there
was no original trial. The court rejected any suggestion that it even
had a right to inquire into the basis for the arbitrator's decision.98
B. Disposition
The above cases involving judicial review of -awards generally
provided some form of remand-to a lower court or to the arbitrator.
In Banks v. Milwaukee hns. Co.,9 9 it was held proper, upon vacatur, to
remand to the arbitrators.
The Oregon Statutes so provide, allowing that if the arbitrators
disregard instructions on remand that the court may then proceed on
its own.10 In a New York case, MVIAC v. Cody,:"' the award was
merely modified. The lower court confirmation had allotted $2,350 of
a $6,050 award to claimant's attorney for fees and disbursements. On
appeal, it was held that, where the amount paid to claimant by the
workmen's compensation carrier exceeded the total award, the entire
amount was due the carrier, and there was no fund to which the attor-
ney's inferior lien could attach.
C. Federal Review
Another aspect of court review not extensively treated here is
the possibility of using a federal court, at any stage, for the review
or determination of an arbitration issue. In Van Horn v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., i 02 the Court of Appeals affirmed a Michigan Dis-
trict Court which sustained insurers' motion to dismiss claimant's action.
The court felt the action was premature, and that a cause of action was
lacking where there was no allegation that arbitration was conducted.
Claimant, in removing the action from state court, argued that insurer
had waived arbitration. The court held that all reasonable remedies
for adjudicating claims established by an insurer must be exhausted
before a suit is brought, even where the usual jurisdictional amount
and diversity grounds are present.
98 Many state arbitration laws have replaced the earlier "functus officio" rationale
with a provision permitting a modification in an award upon timely application
and notice to the opposing party (Uniform Arbitration Act. Sec. 9). Aksen
reports that the few cases on this matter deal with matters of form, and the
statutes generally do not allow for sweeping or fundamental change in the
award.
99 55 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1966).
100 Oau. REV. S.rs. Sec. 33.330(5) (1967).
10124 App. Div. 2d 807, 300 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1969). See also Carter v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 224 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) held: two of
three arbitrators erred under endorsement in taxing against insurer the total
of arbitration fees as part of a second ex parte "supplemental" award, modi-
fication granted.
102 391 F.2d 910 (6 Cir. 1968). See also Rogers v. United States Auto. Ass'n,
410 F.2d 598 (6 Cir. 1969).
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IV. WISCONSIN: ARBITRATION, UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT
There is a minimum of case law in Wisconsin involving uninsured
motorist arbitration. However, the value to the practitioner of cases
from other similar jurisdictions should be apparent. It will be recalled
that at least eighteen states generally enforce arbitration under similar
versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Alaska, Ariz., Fla., Hawaii,
Ill., Mary., Mass., Mich., Minn., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Penn.,
Wash., Wis., Wyo.) Several of these states have adopted a consistant
"literal view" toward the scope of arbitration.
A. Wisconsin Case Law
There appears to be only one Wisconsin case dealing very exten-
sively with uninsured motorist arbitration: Schramm v. Dotz,1' 3 dis-
cussed earlier, held that the insurer had waived its right to compel
arbitration where it had continued to insist on dismissal rather than
arbitration.
In Morateck v. Milwaukee Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 10 4 as to the subsidiary
issue of whether uninsured motorist coverage exists where only one
of the two joint tortfeasors was uninsured, coverage was apparently
found. The opinion reports only that the parties "waived" arbitration
under the endorsement and stipulated instead to Circuit Judge Leo
Hanley as arbitrator.
See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski,105 where separate trials on
the policy defense issue and negligence issue .were recommended. Arbi-
tration was apparently not urged by the parties.
The following, though not uninsured motorist arbitration cases, are
relevant as to general arbitration law in Wisconsin:
It was held in City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd Wright Founda-
tion'06 that statutory arbitration in Wisconsin is specifically enforceable
-thus arbitration itself can be ordered to proceed. This case involved
a contract for architectural services under which a fee dispute was
found arbitrable, thereby causing the court to grant a stay of the city's
declaratory judgment action pending arbitration. The court also pointed
out that every contract subject to Wisconsin law containing an arbi-
tration agreement not clearly excluding the application of the Wis.
Arbitration Act incorporates that Act.107 Moreover, even where the
agreement prescribes the rules of some authority as applicable, the
Wisconsin Act provisions apply if there is a conflict.
Denhart v. Waukesha Brewing Co.,10 held that generally res judi-
cata applies to arbitral awards.
10323 Wis. 2d 678, 127 N.W.2d 779 (1964).
104 34 Wis. 2d 95, 148 N.W.2d 704 (1967).
105 16 Wis. 2d 325, 114 N.W.2d 489 (1962).
106 20 Wis. 2d 361, 122 N.W.2d 409, 20 A.L.R.3d 545 (1963).
107 WIs. STATS. cH. 298.
106 21 Wis. 2d 583, 124 N.W.2d 664 (1963).
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International Union v. Hamilton Beach Mfg. Co. 10 9 held as to a
labor contract that arbitration is not enforceable without an agreement
to arbitrate, and that to find such an agreement is within the jurisdic-
tion of a court.
Darling v. Darling,110 held that where an award failed to receive
confirmation as a statutory award, it might yet be enforced by an action
upon it.
Donaldson v. Buhlman,"' held that various aspects or parts of an
award can at times be severable, so that if one portion is held invalid,
another may yet be enforceable. This case also recited the test to be
met to vacate a common law award.
V. EVALUATION
Where arbitration is enforceable, the question is generally one of
timing-when to commence arbitration. Where arbitration is unen-
forceable, the question (at least for insured) should be one of choice-
between arbitration and an action at law. In either event, several fac-
tors enter into an evaluation of arbitration as a device suitable to a
client's needs at any given time.
At the outset, it should be noted that two different formats for
arbitration exist: (1) the "ad hoc" method112 instituted and still used
wherever permitted"1 by the State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. and a
perhaps-increasing number of other insurers, and (2) the system ad-
ministered by the American Arbitation Association" 4 which is incor-
109 40 Wis. 2d 270, 162 N.W.2d 16 (1968).
11o 16 Wis. 675,(1863).
113-134 Wis. 117, 114 N.W. 431 (1908).
112 Di Carlo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8Z Ill. App.2d 414, 226 N.E.2d
514 (1967) illustrates partially the operation of the State Farm arbitration
clause. In a typical fact situation, insurer and insured were unable to
agree on the claim, insured chose an arbitrator, and State Farm refused
to cooperate. Insured then prevailed upon an Illinois Circuit Court to ap-
point an arbitrator-presumably to represent State Farm. The two arbitrators
met, rendered an ex parte award in insured's favor, and sent a copy to State
Farm, who again refused to pay. Insured then filed a complaint to confirm
and enforce the award. (This complaint went into default, but State Farm
managed to vacate the judgment the same day, alleging an office mix-up)
State Farm then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, admitting the crucial
allegation of physical contact, but urging that the award had not been render-
ed properly under either the endorsement or the state arbitration act (Uni-
form Act). Motion was granted.
The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed, pointing out that the policy pro-
vided no alternative for insured, where insurer refused to choose an arbi-
trator, except to proceed under the Arbitration Act. Under the Act provisions,
however, insured had not properly served the summons necessary to begin,
and the award was therefore vacated.
113 State Farm reports that it must use the AAA system in its policies issued
in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas. Another variance
occurs in California, where a statute requires that only one arbitrator be
used.
114 Uninsured motorist arbitration is only one segment of the operations of
the American Arbitration Association, which does not itself act as arbitrator,
but administers uninsured motorist arbitrations through its "Accidents Claims
Panel Tribunal" and has assembled a specific set of rules for its "Accident
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porated into the Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. The fol-
lowing discussion will distinguish these systems where it is thought to
be significant to the overall evaluation.
The speed of arbitration compared with litigation will vary in
different areas. It is generally conceded that arbitration per se is faster,
though it has been said that practical scheduling problems lead to sur-
prising delays in many instances. This problem would be more serious
under the "ad hoe" system, where five attorneys must be brought
together at one time. Aksen reports that an arbitration can "often" be
completed "within eight weeks."'115 An Illinois survey in 1965 indicated
an average duration under AAA auspices to be fourteen weeks.1 16 A
New York survey indicated an average duration of eight and one-half
months.1
1 7
The comparative mechanics can be important. For instance, AAA
rules do not provide for discovery except at the arbitrators' discretion.I"s
Most pleading requirements are not applicable to arbitration, of
course. 19 Also, under AAA, the admission of evidence is almost com-
pletely at the arbitrator's discretion. The ad hoc endorsement prescribes
the usual evidence rules, though it is unclear whether any practical
difference results. We have already noted the relative lack of right
to judicial review of arbitration awards.
Relative cost can be a factor:
AAA Fees (Rules sec. 37, 38, 39)
a. $50 administrative, paid by the party who initiates arbitration.
b. $100, plus an added variable amount paid as part of an annual
assessment under the contract arrangement between AAA and
Claims Tribunal." Thus, this non-profit New York-chartered corporation
maintains panels of volunteer attorney-arbitrators in over 1600 communities,
administered through some twenty-one regional offices (nearest: Chicago or
Minneapolis). Arbitrations in uninsured motorist disputes, numbering 9,944
in 1968, generated over one-half of AAA's operating income that year.
(Operations of this segment are said to be a financially self-sustaining cycle,
while some other areas of AAA effort have drawn support from private
foundations.)
The nearest AAA regional office furnishes upon request: Accident Claims
Tribunal Rules, Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Claims (brief booklet),
and four copies of the form Demand for Arbitration.
115 Aksen, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 504 INS.
L. J. 17 (1965).116 Pretzel, Uninsured Motorist, 515 INs. L. 3 .711 (1965).
117 Aksen, supra note 118.
"' Only one state has authorized discovery in its arbitration legislation (CAL.
INS. CoDE, § 11580.2 provides that the Superior Court, however, has juris-
diction over discovery.) Note however, Wis. STAT. § 298.07 providing that
"Upon petition, approved by the arbitrators . . ." a court may direct the taking
of depositions. Also, the endorsement requires claimant to submit to a physi-
cal examination, and to an examination under oath. See Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Adair, 421 Pa. 141, 218 A.2d 791 (1966) on discovery under AAA
arbitration.
119 Under AAA, the initiating party serves the Demand For Arbitration setting
forth the matter in dispute, amount claimed, and remedy sought. The other
party then may file an Answer. (AAA 1970 Rules sec. 4) Formal Stipula-
tions, briefs, and Submission Agreements are also used.
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various insurance associations, who sponsored the program at
its start, and who continue the relationship. Of late, this $100
fee can remain unpaid if insurer anticipates that court action
prior to arbitration will eliminate the need for arbitration.
Also, if paid under these circumstances, it is later refundable.
c. $25 paid by each party for any subsequent hearing.
d. $10 adjournament feet.
e. $3 per hour "overtime" fee.
f. Various possible minor expenses
g. An Oregon statute requires that arbitrators be paid $50.00
per day. No other state as yet appears to require such payment.
"Ad hoc" Abitration Fees
"Expenses of arbitration" are borne equally. The total is said to
average $700-750. Arbitrators are paid, generally, at their "office time"
hourly rates. Attorney and expert witness fees are not regarded, though,
as "expenses of arbitration." (See arbitration clause.)
Also, it is often said that the time needed to prepare for and "try"
a hearing is as great as is needed for a trial. Note again that the usual
uninsured motorist coverage limit is 10/20, and that even the normal
adjudicative proceedings in most states which enforce arbitration re-
quire three stages: a court hearing on the stay, a trial of "coverage"
issues, and the arbitration hearing itself.
The size of awards and impartiality of arbitrators are perhaps by
far the most critical factors-for both plaintiff and defendant.
Aksen has on several occasions mentioned tentative survey findings
generated by the Project for Effective Justice of the Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law.120 The conclusion is that there is a "very low inci-
dence of dissatisfaction with the conduct of the arbitration," and that
"on the average, the result (amount of award) obtained in the arbitra-
tion of a moderate personal injury case would be the same as though
it were tried before a jury."
However, it has been said that the AAA panels are "loaded" with
"plaintiff's attorneys;"' 121 though it has also been said that there is
simply a much greater number of "plaintiff's attorneys" practicing law.
Also, especially in Peiinsylvania, where we have noted the heavy em-
phasis placed on arbitration, the looseness and informality of hearings
is said to work in the plaintiff's favor.
120 Widiss, supra note 7, at 248 et seq.
121 As to the procedure for selecting an arbitrator, AAA submits a list of names,
administratively chosen from the Accident Claims Panel, to the parties, who
can object to some or all names included (since 1964). AAA selects usually
one (has discretion at the request of a party to appoint three, 1970 Rules
Sec. 8) and notifies parties. An oath is administered.
All members of the Accident Claims Panel are attorneys, generally ex-
perienced in negligence and insurance law (1970 Rules Sec. 3). Once ap-
pointed, objection to an arbitrator can only be an allegation of his financial
or personal interest in the result (1970 Rules Sec. 9). An arbitrator has a
duty to disclose anything "likely to create a presumption of bias . . ." (1970
Rules Sec. 9).
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Apparently there is even greater dissatisfaction with the AAA
arbitration system than has appeared in regularly published materials
or commentary." Significantly, one major auto insurer has indicated
that even under its ad hoc method, awards tend to be measurably
higher on the same injuries than jury trial awards.123 At the same time,
this insurer reportedly has absolutely no intention of considering the
adoption of the standard AAA provision.
Another auto insurer, dissatisfied with its results under the AAA
system, reports that the Insurance Rating Board is currently consider-
ing the adoption of the following language:
... the matter or matters upon which such person and the com-
pany do not agree shall be settled by arbitration, which shall be
conducted in accordance with ,the rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association unless other means of conducting the arbitration
• are agreed to between the insured and the company..." (empha-
sis supplied)
DAVID S. CHARTIER
APPENDIX
The standard uninsured motorist endorsement, in two separate sections,
states that certain disputes between insurer and insured are to be arbitrated
if these parties cannot reach agreement:
The 1966 Standard Form, Part I: Coverage reads:
The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of
an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including
death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury", sustained by the
insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes of this endorse-
ment, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally
enttled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made
by agreement between the insured or such representative and the company or,
if they fail to agree, by arbitration.
The 1966 Form, Part VI: Additional Conditions, F Arbitration reads:
If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that
such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator
.of an un:nsured automobile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not
agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this endorse-
ment, then, upon written demand of either, the matters upon which such person
and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in .any court having juris-
diction thereof. Such person and the company each agree to consider itself
bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this
endorsement.
122 The Defense Research Institute, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, recently conducted
a correspondence survey of the experience of major auto insurers with the
arbitration systems. This writer appreciates having been given the oppor-
tunity to review these materials. The conclusions drawn however are solely
those of the writer.
123 One device used to control the "runaway award" is an advance- agreement
between the parties: regardless of the amount set, claimant agrees to be
satisfied with a definite maximum in return for the insurer's promise to pay
a definite minimum. Where the amount set falls between these agreed limits,
of course, it would be accepted by both parties. This type of "control con-
tract" is said to be gaining in popularity. Coulson, Uninsured Motorist Cover-
age Arbitration, 16th Annual Workshop, Nat'l Association of Independent
Insurers, Washington, D.C. at 188 (April 1970).
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SECTION Ill-UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE INSURING AGREEMENTS
COVERAGE U-DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY CAUSED BY UNIN-
SURED MOTOR VEHICLES
To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured
motor vehicle, provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to
whether the insired or such representative is legally entitled to recover such
damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between
the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree,
by arbitration.
Arbitration. If any person making claim under coverage U and the company
do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to the
insured, .or do not agree as to the amount payable hereunder, then each party
shall, upon written demand of either, select a competent and disinterested arbi-
trator. The two arbitrators so named shall select a third arbitrator, or if unable
to agee thereon within 30 days, then upon request of the insired or the company
such third arbitrator shall be selected by a judge of a court of record in the
county and state in which such arbitration is pending. The arbitrators shall then
hear and determine the question or questions so in dispute, and the decision in
writing of any two arbitrators shall be binding upon the insured and the com-
pany, each of whom shall pay his or its chosen arbitrator and shall bear equally
the expense of the third arbitrator and all other expenses of the arbitration, pro-
vided that attorney fees and fees paid to medical or other expert witnesses are
not deemed to be expenses of arbitration but are to be borne by the party in-
curring them. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the arbitration shall be con-
ducted in the county and state in which the insured resides and in accordance
with the usual rules governing procedure and admission of evidence in courts of
law.
Erie Insurance Exchange, Erie, Pennsylvania, in Jan., 1,969, switched from
an AAA clause to the following:
C. Under Part III, Coverage A-2-Uninsured Motorists Insurance-Condition
1. "Arbitration" is hereby amended to read:
Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and the ERIE does not
agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to
the Insured, or do not agree as to the amount payable hereunder, then
each party shall, upon written demand of either, select to a competent
and disinterested arbitrator. These two arbitrators shall select a third
competent and disinterested arbitrator, or if unable to agree thereon
within 30 days, then upon request the Insured or the ERIE such third
arbitrator shall be selected by a judge of a court of record in the county
and state in which such arbitration is pending. The arbitrators shall then
hear and determine the question or questions so in dispute, and the In-
sured and the ERIE each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound
by the decision in writing of any two arbitrators. The Insured and the
ERIE shall pay his or its chosen arbitrator and shall bear equally the ex-
pense of the third arbitrator and all other expenses of the arbitration,
provided that attorney fees and fees pa:d to medical and other expert
witnesses are not deemed to be expenses of arbitration but are to be
borne by the party incurring them. Unless the parties otherwise agree,
the arbitration shall be conducted in county and state in which the In-
sured resides and in accordance with the usual rules governing procedure
and admission of evidence in courts of law. Except for the provisions set
forth above, any arbitration hereunder shall be conducted under and
accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act of the jur'sdic-
tion in which the arbitration takes place, if any such Act exists;
otherwise, in accordance with the law of that jurisdiction pertaining
to common law arbitration."
Except for the final sentence, this is essentially the State Farm provision.
The American Family Insurance Group, Madison, Wisconsin has used the
prov.sion below. It is essentially the State Farm provision with a clause deleted,
referring to attorney and expert witness fees.
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Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and the company
do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily in-
jury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount payable hereunder,
then each party shall, upon written demand of either, select a competent
and disinterested arbitrator. T he two arbitrators so named shall select a
third arbitrator, or if unable to agree thereon within 30 days, then upon
request of the insured or the company such third arbitrator shall be se-
lected by a judge of a court of record in the county and state in which
such arbitration is pending. The arbitrators shall then hear and deter-
mine the question or questions so in dispute, and the decision in writing
of any two arbitrators shall be binding upon the insured and the compa-
ny, each of whom shall pay his or its chosen arbitrator and shall bear
equally the expense of the third arbitrator and all other expenses of the
arbitration. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the arbitration shall be
conducted in the county and state in which the insured resides and in
accordance with the usual rules governing procedure and admission of
evidence in courts of law
Deleted language.
" provided that attbrney fees and fees paid to medical or other expert
witness are not deemed to be expenses of arbitration but are to be borne
by the party incurring them." (State Farm)
